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It has been a great honor to serve the Ukrainian people as the Minister of Defense.

Here is what our team managed to achieve:

1. Disabled Starlink access for Russian forces.

2. Took over a Ministry of Defense with zero budget, took a risk, reallocated funds from payroll from the end of the year, and effectively invested them in mid-strike capabilities, fiber-optic FPVs, low-cost reconnaissance, ground robotic platforms, interceptor drones, and deep-strike drones.

3. Launched "Logistical Lockdown", this cut off enemy logistics and initiated the isolation of Crimea.

4. Continued the funding program for the Drone Line.

5. Launched a support program for modern drone-assault units that rely primarily on advanced technologies in combat.

6. Introduced a 70% advance payment policy for procurements made via e-Points on the Brave1 Market portal.

7. Fundamentally overhauled the procurement system.

8. Procured thousands of pickup trucks, buggies, and ATVs for the military for the first time—and did so through open tenders.

9. The drone interception rate rose from 83% to 91%, and the cruise missile interception rate soared from 47% to 87%.

10. Contracted Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for the first time, and submitted an application through an EU loan to purchase PAC-3 missiles.

11. Launched a baseline drone supply system for brigades and corps.

12. Launched a massive grant program for manufacturers of explosives and missiles.

13. Initiated an unpopular but vital transformation of the military.

14. Conducted three UDCG meetings, where we successfully broke through the Russian information trap claiming our defeat, restoring partners' faith in Ukraine. This secured $40 billion in support announced for this year (excluding the EU loan).

15. Launched the mechanism to utilize the EU loan for our military priorities.

16. Found a way to scale cheap missiles against jet-powered Shaheds and signed a record-breaking contract.

17. Our domestic ballistics. We radically revised the technical specifications, maximized accuracy, and reduced the cost by 30%.

18. Signed a contract to procure Gripen fighter jets.

19. Collaborated with the military to plan and execute Operation Auchan, which halted the enemy's mechanized offensive for six months.

20. Opened up exports under the Drone Deal program to attract investment and scale up domestic defense-industrial complex (OPK) production.

21. Launched the Trophy Lab, providing partners with the opportunity to study captured Russian military technologies.

22. Launched the Defense AI Center A1 to accelerate the integration of artificial intelligence on the battlefield.

Thank you to my entire team for their relentless 24/7 service. A special thank you to my family for their patience.

Thank you all for your support!

I will continue to work toward the mission I originally brought to the Ministry of Defense: defeating the enemy through asymmetry, the speed of innovation, and the power of organization.

To be continued.

Right — because who in the Ministry of Defense of the 21st century, in the age of the drone revolution, combat robots, and military AI, really needs a 35-year-old IT top executive who led the digital transformation of an entire nation and can pick up the phone to ask Elon Musk to shut off Starlink for Russians.

No, what we need is a former high-ranking cop who boasts about making recruits tuck in their beds with perfect hospital corners and who happens to suit the generals and the major defense contractors just fine.

Here's what a senior Ukrainian government source, someone part of Zelenskky's inner circle, told me about Fedorov back in November, before he was appointed Minister of Defense:

“He’s the only guy who has a war plan. He wants to change the high command. He wants to replace them with young people who have proved themselves through performance, so that ordinary people understand these are not Soviet Union people, they are commanders who care about people’s lives.”

Igor Klymenko is the guy they're now positioning to replace Fedorov at the Defense Ministry, and the contrast could not be more surgical. Fedorov was the young technocrat who accelerated drone procurement, opened tenders, and tried to drag the ministry out of Soviet-era sludge into something that actually produces results at scale. Klymenko is the 53-year-old career silovik who came up through the MVS as a psychologist, ran the National Police, served in Kosovo, fought in ATO, and took over as Interior Minister after Monastyrsky was killed in early 2023. First cop, not politician, in that seat in a decade.

What he actually delivered at MVS matters. The flagship was "Gvardiya Nastupu," especially the police brigade "Liut" which I respect because I've seen them work up close. By late 2024 ten thousand police were fighting on the front, another quarter of personnel rotated through frontline regions, and those mixed assault brigades of cops, border guards, and National Guard actually cleared and held de-occupied ground. Discipline, vertical command, personal responsibility for commanders, after-action investigations, rotations, veteran instructors, longer polygon training when units broke. That is his signature.

Zelenskyy clearly wants someone who can finally fix mobilization without turning the country into a police state circus. Klymenko has spent his life managing large coercive structures, shaping manpower, enforcing standards. Expect tighter coordination between ZSU, police, border service, and TCC. Expect serious focus on turning conscripts into soldiers instead of cannon fodder. The "military startup" vibe that Fedorov brought is probably over.

Here is the risk, and it is not small. Klymenko is a product of the MVS system. He knows exactly how it works and shows zero appetite for breaking its closed culture. When asked about corruption among his subordinates he gives the corporate shrug. That loyalty to the machine is exactly what the Defense Ministry does not need right now. Drone purchases have finally accelerated, tender rules are biting, new tech teams are delivering. A guy with zero background in defense industry or technological transformation could easily stall the only part of the ministry that has started to function at wartime speed. Will he have the brains not to wreck what is already working? We are about to find out.

Bottom line: the Defense Minister does not command troops in the field. He runs procurement, mobilization, international partnerships, and the giant bureaucratic beast that feeds the front. Klymenko's strength is large-scale personnel management and iron discipline. His weakness is the total absence of experience in the tech-industrial side of modern war and the very real chance he imports the MVS habit of protecting the system instead of reforming it.

The core test is simple. Can he deliver better trained mobilized soldiers, fewer chaotic TCC round-ups, sustained drone momentum, and actual coordination between services without turning the ministry into another closed silo? Mobilization discipline is overdue,

Russia lost its LAST untouched refinery.

SALAVAT, deep in Bashkortostan, survived every Ukrainian strike this year until last night.

Drones flew 1,500 km to reach it, hitting both primary processing units and setting the plant on fire.

It handles 10 million tons of oil a year.

The same night, Ukraine also hit the Afipsky refinery in Krasnodar (6.25 million tons/year) and an oil transshipment hub at Gelendzhik that feeds Russia's military logistics.

Local officials confirmed both fires. Russian air defenses stopped none of it.

The message: there's NO REFINERY LEFT in Russia that's actually out of reach anymore.

https://themerchantsnews.substack.com/p ... ks-hawkish

I regularly read the enemy’s Telegram channels - and today I cannot believe my eyes: even Russians understand what this is really about:

"The official version that Fedorov derailed the reform of mobilization and recruitment does not stand up to criticism.

Fedorov successfully introduced innovative forms of supply and support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, borrowed from commercial management, and at the same time seized control over billion-dollar financial flows. A huge part of what was not stolen was, contrary to the agreed plans, directed toward drones, digitalization, and artificial intelligence, against the intentions of the generals who believe that the fate of the war is decided by combined-arms operations.

Fedorov is the only one among the civilian wartime ministers who was able to effectively influence the sphere of actual armed struggle. The Ukrainian side’s ability to conduct strategic operations in the air and at sea is attributed by propaganda precisely to the efforts of the group of civilian technocrats and financial operators headed by him. Zelensky and his circle undoubtedly saw in this a repetition of the situation of 2022–2023, when the seizure of the initiative on the battlefield immediately gave rise to the presidential ambitions of the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi.

Now Zelensky is not repeating his previous mistakes and is removing a probable competitor, without waiting for his failure, at the peak of the capabilities of the strategy being implemented by the techno-fascists to destroy Russian rear areas and communications.

The choice in favor of political expediency over military necessity is obvious".

Fedorov repeatedly blocked attempts to steer lucrative procurement contracts to favoured companies, which put him at odds with powerful figures inside Ukraine’s political and defence establishment, said people familiar with the situation.”

I just arrived in Kramatorsk and the car sent to collect me was hit by an FPV minutes before pulling up. The driver is an energy worker taking me to the power station. russias “human safari” is spreading way beyond Kherson. This is deliberate terror.

Devastation of the Russian Shipping Industry: Ukraine has significantly escalated its drone operations, striking over 136 Russian ships in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea in just 10 days (0:28 - 1:46). Russia has effectively halted shipping in the area to assess the damage (2:16).
The Kerch Bridge Status: A commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces confirmed that the Kerch Bridge remains standing intentionally to allow Russians to evacuate Crimea as the peninsula becomes increasingly uninhabitable due to electricity, water, and food shortages (4:27 - 5:43).
Russian Fuel Crisis: Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries have pushed processing rates to the lowest levels since 2005 (7:52 - 8:14). This has caused severe fuel shortages, forcing local governments to urge officials to use bicycles or work remotely (8:46 - 9:40).
International Relations: The Wall Street Journal reports that China is actively building relationships with potential future Russian leaders, anticipating the death or removal of Putin as Russia becomes increasingly isolated and dependent on China (18:16 - 19:34).
Ukrainian Government Changes: President Zelenskyy has dismissed the Minister of Defense, Fedorov, following disagreements with military leadership regarding procurement strategies. This decision has sparked significant debate among observers and analysts (19:35 - 27:30).
International Support: France has granted Ukraine licenses to produce advanced weapons, including Scalp missiles and Aster 30 missiles, while the UK is participating in a major EU loan program for Ukraine (27:30 - 28:07).